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PRECAP: Beach v. State: Whether Retroactivity Will Render the
Apple Ripe for Another Bite.
E. Lars Phillips
No.
DC11-0723,
Montana Supreme Court

OP

14-0685

Oral Argument: Wednesday, February 4th, 2015, at 9:30 AM in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, located in the Joseph P.
Mazurek Justice Building, Helena, Montana.
I. QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the continued incarceration of Barry Beach, currently
serving a term of 100 years in prison without the possibility of parole, for
a crime, deliberate homicide, committed as a juvenile, violate the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or Art. II, § 22, of the Montana
Constitution?
II. BACKGROUND
On June 16, 1979, roughly four months after Barry Beach turned
seventeen, Kimberly Nees was found dead near Poplar, Montana.1 On
May 11, 1984, he was convicted of deliberate homicide and sentenced to
one hundred years in prison without the possibility of parole.2 As Beach
appears before the Montana Supreme Court for a third time in the last
decade, it is important to clearly define the scope of the question facing
the Court. Beach is proceeding on writ of habeas corpus.3 As recognized
by the Court in State v. Lott,4 the writ exists “to remedy ‘extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice [system].’”5 At its core level,
the purpose of habeas corpus is not to correct errors of fact, but to cut
directly to the question of whether or not the imprisonment of an
individual “conform[s] with the fundamental requirements of the law.”6
Therefore, the Court is not being asked to determine whether
seventeen-year-old Barry Beach murdered Kimberly Nees on June 16,
1979.7 As noted by former Justice Brian Morris, that question was
1

State v. Beach, 705 P.2d 94, 97, 99 (Mont. 1985).
Id. at 100.
3
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–22–101 (2013).
4
150 P.3d 337 (Mont. 2006).
5
Id. at 342 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
6
Id. at 339 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963)).
7
That question has been litigated extensively. See State v. Beach, 705 P.2d 94 (Mont. 1985); Beach
v. Day, 913 P.2d 622 (Mont. 1996); Beach v. State (Beach I), 220 P.3d 667 (Mont. 2009); State v.
Beach (Beach II), 302 P.3d 47 (Mont. 2013).
2
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answered, likely for the final time, in State v. Beach (Beach II).8 Instead,
the question to be decided is whether or not a district court’s
discretionary act of sentencing a defendant, who committed homicide as
a juvenile, to one hundred years in prison without the possibility of
parole violates either the U.S. Constitution or the Constitution of the
State of Montana.
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Beach frames the question before the Court as having two parts.
First, does the district court’s perceived failure to consider his juvenile
status as a mitigating factor during sentencing render the sentence
unconstitutional? And, second, does the perceived failure to provide
meaningful opportunity for release render the sentence unconstitutional?
However, as shown by the State’s arguments, the question is not likely
that simple. There are three distinct hurdles Beach must overcome to
prevail on his petition: first, he must show that his petition is properly
before the Court; second, he must show that the case law, upon which he
relies, is retroactive; and, third, he must show that he is entitled to relief
under those cases. As each of these issues provide significant issues that
may be addressed at oral argument, they will be briefly addressed in turn.
A. Properly Before the Court
Beach acknowledges that § 46–22–101(2), MCA, bars a
petitioner who has “exhausted the remedy of appeal” from seeking relief
under the writ of habeas corpus. He contends, however, that under State
v. Lott the bar does not apply because the district court was without
authority to impose the sentence.9 The State contends that, because the
district court was acting within its authority when sentencing Beach, the
sentence is not “facially invalid” and the Lott exception does not apply.10
The State argues that because the sentence is not facially invalid, and
because Beach has exhausted his remedy of appeal, the petition should
be dismissed outright. 11
B. Juvenile Status
Beach argues his sentence is unconstitutional because the district
court failed to take into account his status as a juvenile at the time of the

8

Beach II, 302 P.3d at 87 (Morris, J., dissenting).
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 7–8, Oct. 23, 2014, No. DA 11-0723.
10
Attorney General’s Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 7, Nov. 28, 2014, No. DA 110723.
11
Attorney General’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10.
9
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crime.12 To support this argument, Beach cites a trio of recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions defining the boundaries of cruel and unusual
punishment regarding juvenile defendants: Roper v. Simmons,13 Graham
v. Florida,14 and Miller v. Alabama.15 Beach’s primary argument relies
on Miller for the premise that the district court’s failure to “make [an]
individualized determination” of his culpability in light of his juvenile
status renders the sentence unconstitutional.16 To further support this
point, Beach cites State v. Long,17 where the Ohio Supreme Court held
that not only must the court specifically consider juvenile status as a
mitigating factor when sentencing a person to life without parole, such
consideration must be reflected in the record.18 Beach concludes that the
district court’s failure to consider the Miller factors at sentencing renders
his sentence unconstitutional.19
In response, the State argues that Beach has misinterpreted not
only Miller, but all the U.S. Supreme Court cases on which he relies. The
State contends, in relevant part: Roper, where the Court held sentencing
juveniles to death was unconstitutional, does not apply because Beach
was not sentenced to death20; Graham, where the Court held sentencing a
juvenile to life without parole for a non-homicidal crime was
unconstitutional, does not apply because Beach was convicted of
homicide21; and, Miller, where the Court held that applying mandatory
life without parole sentencing guidelines to juvenile defendants was
unconstitutional, does not apply because Beach’s sentence was
discretionary.22 Further, the State notes that, even if Miller were
applicable, the information considered by the district court would have
led the court to the same conclusion had the Miller factors been
considered.23
C. Meaningful Opportunity for Release
Alternatively, Beach argues that failure to provide a meaningful
opportunity for release renders the sentence unconstitutional.24 In
support of this proposition, Beach relies heavily on Graham and
contends that “the trial court must impose a sentence that provides Beach
12

Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
15
132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012).
16
Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10.
17
8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio 2014).
18
Id. at 893.
19
Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10.
20
Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10.
21
Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 10–11.
22
Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 11.
23
Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 12–13.
24
Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 15.
13
14
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[with] a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.’”25 The State responds that, even if Graham
did apply, Beach has received meaningful opportunities for release.26 In
support of that argument, the State notes that Beach has come before the
Clemency Board on four separate occasions.27
IV. ANALYSIS
Beach III presents three, sequential questions: whether the
Petition is properly before the Court; if so, whether the case law, upon
which Beach relies, applies retroactively; and, if both of the previous
questions are answered affirmatively, whether the relief sought in the
Petition is warranted.
A. Whether the Petition for Habeas Corpus is properly before the Court.
As noted by the State, § 46–22–101(2), MCA, limits the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus to persons who have not
exhausted their remedy of appeal. This limitation is directly at odds with
Art. II, § 19, of the Montana Constitution which states “[t]he privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended.” Beach III provides
the Court with an opportunity to broaden the Lott exception, which
provides the bar within § 46–22–101(2), MCA, can only be tolled for
“facially invalid” sentences, to a more constitutionally sound
interpretation by holding that the writ of habeas corpus may never be
suspended. As both sides of this issue are clearly defined, it is likely that
neither side will allocate much time to the question at oral arguments,
opting instead to allow the Court to make that determination.
B. Whether the Eighth Amendment cases apply retroactively.
If the Petition is not barred by § 46–22–101(2), MCA, the Court
may have the opportunity to reach a currently contested question:
whether Miller or Graham have retroactive effect in Montana. Given the
implications on the case, namely that Beach may not rely on the cases if
they are not found to be retroactive, this question will likely be
vigorously debated at oral argument.
1. Whether Miller applies retroactively.
At the federal level, the question of whether or not Miller is
retroactive is hotly contested. Recently, the Seventh Circuit noted that
25

Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 15 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 74).
Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 14–15.
27
Att’y Gen.’s Resp. Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 14.
26
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this question has spurred a split among the Circuit Courts: the First,
Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have determined that certain “applicants
. . . have made prima facie showings that Miller is retroactive,” while the
Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have held that Miller is not retroactive.28 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has, on three separate occasions,
expressly stated that it has not yet determined the question.29 Notably, in
December of 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in Toca v.
Louisiana,30 to address the Circuit split over whether Miller applies
retroactively.31 Even with the uncertainty in the federal courts, the
Montana Supreme Court may be willing to follow the determination of
the high court in our sister State, Wyoming, which recently held the
Miller rule to be retroactive.32
2. Whether Graham applies retroactively.
Similar to a determination regarding Miller, the Montana
Supreme Court may reach the issue of whether Graham applies
retroactively. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet answered that
question, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have held that Graham is
retroactive.33
C. Whether the relief sought under the Eight Amendment cases is
warranted.
If the Montana Supreme Court finds either Graham or Miller to
be retroactive, the Court must determine whether the relief sought by the
Petition is warranted. Due to the dissimilarity between the facts in Beach
III and the holdings in Graham and Miller, this topic will likely be
discussed at length at oral argument.
1. Whether the relief sought under Miller is warranted.
Here, the Court faces a two part question: first, whether Miller is
applicable to Beach III, and, if so, whether the relief sought is warranted.
As to the first question, the Court may look to a recent decision by the
Ninth Circuit, Adams v. U.S.,34 where the Court held that Miller was
inapplicable to a juvenile defendant “not sentenced to life without the

28

Croft v. Williams, __ F.3d __, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22283, 2 (7th Cir. 2014).
Bell v. Uribe, 748 F.3d 857, 870 (9th Cir. 2013); Friedlander v. U.S., 542 Fed.Appx. 576, 577 (9th
Cir. 2013); Adams v. U.S., 583 Fed.Appx. 658, 659 (9th Cir. 2014).
30
Petition for writ of certiorari GRANTED, Dec. 12, 2014, No. 14-6381.
31
Petition for a writ of certiorari 2, Sep. 18, 2014, No. 14-6381 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460).
32
State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 491 (Wyo. 2014).
33
Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2013).
34
583 Fed.Appx. 658 (9th Cir. 2014).
29
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possibility of parole pursuant to a mandatory sentencing scheme.”35
Along similar lines, the Seventh Circuit recently refused to apply Miller
where a juvenile petitioner had been subject to a discretionary, instead of
mandatory, sentence of life without the possibility of parole.36
If the Montana Supreme Court finds Miller to be applicable, the
Court may look to recent Ninth Circuit decisions, Bell v. Uribe,37 and
Friedlander v. U.S.,38 for instruction. In Bell, the Ninth Circuit held that
Miller was not violated where a court had considered “both mitigating
and aggravating factors under a sentencing scheme that affords discretion
and leniency.”39 Similarly, in Friedlander, where a juvenile was
sentenced to life in prison with a concurrent term of twenty years, the
Ninth Circuit held that, even if Miller were retroactive, the claim was
without merit as the Petitioner had not been sentenced to “life without
parole,” as evidenced by his having “seen the parole board
approximately 8 time[s].”40
2. Whether the relief sought under Graham is warranted.
Here, the Court faces a similar two part question: whether
Graham is applicable to Beach III, and whether the relief sought is
warranted. It bears noting that Beach’s reliance on Graham is tenuous at
best. In Graham, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[a] State is not
required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted
of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give
[defendants convicted of a nonhomicide crime] some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”41 Even though the Court explicitly limited the
“meaningful opportunity” requirement to defendants convicted of
nonhomicide crimes, Beach relies on Graham for the premise that the
State must allow him some meaningful opportunity for release.42
V. CONCLUSION
Beach III provides yet another bite at the apple for a persistent
petitioner. While it is unlikely that the Court will find in favor of Beach,
Beach III may give the Court an opportunity to clarify habeas corpus
jurisprudence in Montana. First, the Court may find that, even if not
applicable to Beach, both Miller and Graham are retroactive in Montana.
35

Id. at 659 (quoting Bell, 748 F.3d at 869).
Croft, __ F.3d at __, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22283 at 3–4.
748 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2013).
38
542 Fed.Appx. 576 (9th Cir. 2013).
39
Bell, 748 F.3d at 870.
40
Friedlander, 542 Fed.Appx. at 577.
41
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
42
Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus 15.
36
37
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And second, Beach III may provide the Court with an opportunity to
declare that the writ of habeas corpus may never be suspended, and bring
§ 46–22–101(2), MCA, back in line with the Art. II, § 19, of the
Montana Constitution. Regardless of the outcome, it bears repeating that
the innocence of Barry Beach is not at issue in this current proceeding.
Rather, the Court will be determining whether the Eighth Amendment, or
Art. II, § 22, of the Montana Constitution, permits sentencing a
defendant, who committed homicide as a juvenile, to one hundred years
in prison without the possibility of parole.
Attorneys for Petitioner, Barry A. Beach: Terrance L. Toavs, Law
Offices of Terrance L. Toavs, Wolf Point, MT; Peter A. Camiel, Mair &
Camiel, P.S., Seattle, WA.
Attorneys for Respondent, State of Montana: Timothy C. Fox, Montana
Attorney General, Helena, MT; Ralph J. Patch, Roosevelt County
Attorney, Wolf Point, MT.

